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1 
GREAT ACCOUNTABILITY SHOULD 
ACCOMPANY GREAT POWER: 
THE ECJ AND THE U.N. SECURITY 
COUNCIL IN KADI I & II 
Vanessa Arslanian* 
Abstract: Over a decade ago, the United Nations (UN) Security Council 
added Yassin Abdullah Kadi’s name to a list of hundreds of individuals 
suspected of associating with Al-Qaida and the Taliban. The Security 
Council directed UN Member States to freeze the listed individuals’ assets 
and to limit their travel. The Council of the European Union (EC) subse-
quently passed regulations giving direct effect to the UN sanctions re-
gime. In 2008, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) annulled one such 
implementing regulation, but assigned responsibility for remedying con-
siderable due process defects inherent in the regime to Community insti-
tutions rather than the UN Security Council. Leaving this task to the Eu-
ropean Union (EU) presents a logistical impossibility. Instead, the 
Security Council should create a court to review its own listing decisions 
and ensure fair procedure. The ECJ should allocate responsibility to the 
Security Council, while preserving the EU legal order’s autonomy. In Kadi 
II, Mr. Kadi’s current appeal, the ECJ has the opportunity to indicate that 
it would accept the authority of a court dedicated to hearing challenges 
to listing decisions, provided it satisfies the European Court of Human 
Rights’ definition of an independent and impartial tribunal under Article 
6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Introduction 
 In late 2001, the UN Security Council’s Al-Qaida Sanctions Com-
mittee (Sanctions Committee)1 added Saudi businessman Yassin Abdul-
                                                                                                                      
* Vanessa Arslanian is a Managing Editor for the Boston College International & Com-
parative Law Review. She would like to thank Professor Vlad Perju for his insight and assis-
tance with this Comment. 
1 The “Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 
(2011) Concerning Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities” goes by different 
names. See United Nations, General Information on the Work of the Committee, Security Council 
Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning Al-
Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/ 
1267/information.shtml (last visited Oct. 15, 2012). The Committee, formerly known as the 
 
2 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 35: E. Supp. 
lah Kadi’s name to the Consolidated List of individuals and groups as-
sociated with Al-Qaida and the Taliban.2 The Sanctions Committee also 
                                                                                                                      
“1267 Al-Qaida Taliban Sanctions Committee,” is now the “Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee,” 
with a separate committee in place to implement sanctions for suspected Taliban associates. 
See, e.g., Chairmanship of the Al Qaeda & Taliban Sanctions Committees, Permanent Mission of 
Ger. to the UN N.Y., http://www.new-york-un.diplo.de/Vertretung/newyorkvn/en/05/al-
qaida-and-taliban-sanctions-committees.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2012). Different authors 
refer to this committee by different names, including the “1267 Committee,” and the “Sanc-
tions Committee.” See, e.g., Joined Cases C-402 & 415/05, Kadi v. Council (Kadi I ), 2008 
E.C.R. I-6351, ¶ 15 (referring to the Committee only as the “Sanctions Committee”); Lor-
raine Finlay, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Kadi Decision and Judicial Review of Security 
Council Resolutions, 18 Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 477, 479 (2010) (referring to the Committee 
as both the “1267 Committee” and the “1267 Sanctions Committee”). 
2 See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee 
Deletes Entry of Yasin Abdullah Ezzedine Qadi from its List, U.N. Press Release SC/10785 
(Oct. 5, 2012), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2012/sc10785.doc.htm; 
see also Finlay, supra note 1, at 479–80; Andrew Hudson, Not a Great Asset: The UN Security 
Council’s Counter-Terrorism Regime: Violating Human Rights, 25 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 203, 206 
(2007). See generally United Nations, The List Established and Maintained by the 1267 Committee 
with Respect to Individuals, Groups, Undertakings and Other Entities Associated with Al-Qaida, 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pdf/AQList.pdf (last updated Oct. 5, 2012) [here-
inafter Consolidated List] (listing individuals currently under sanctions for alleged con-
nections to Al-Qaida). Mr. Kadi’s case began with this listing, and he now approaches his 
tenth year of litigation, although the Security Council has removed him from the sanctions 
list. See Case T-85/09, Kadi v. Comm’n (Kadi II), 2010 E.C.R. _____ (not yet published, 
decided Sept. 30, 2010), ¶ 37, available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document. 
jsf?text&docid=83733&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1 
&cid=1039687; U.N. Press Release SC/10785, supra. Mr. Kadi’s case has been decided 
three times: once in 2005 in the Court of First Instance (CFI)—which has since been re-
named the General Court (GC)—then on appeal to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
in 2008, again on remand to the GC in 2010, and has since been appealed. See Appeal 
Brought on 13th December 2010 by the European Commission Against the Judgment of the General 
Court (Seventh Chamber) Delivered on 30th September 2010 in Case T-85/09: Yassin Abdullah Kadi 
v. European Commission, 2011 O.J. (C 72) 9, 9 [hereinafter Appeal Brought on 13th Decem-
ber 2010]; Finlay, supra note 1, at 483. The European Commission, the Council of the Eu-
ropean Union, and the United Kingdom each brought appeals against the General Court’s 
2010 judgment. See Appeal Brought on 16 December 2010 by the Council of the European Union 
Against the Judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) Delivered on 30th September 2010 in 
Case T-85/09: Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. European Commission, 2011 O.J. (C 72) 9, 9–10; Appeal 
Brought on 16 December 2010 by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Against 
the Judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) Delivered on 30th September 2010 in Case T-
85/09: Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. European Commission, 2011 O.J. (C 72) 10, 10–11. The ECJ 
hears appeals from the GC. See Court of Justice of the Eur. Union, General Court: Presenta-
tion: Jurisdiction, Curia, http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7033/#compet (last visited 
Oct. 15, 2012). These three cases have since been joined. Case C-584/10, Order of the 
President of the Court (unpublished, entered Feb. 9, 2011), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/ 
document/document.jsf?text=&docid=81825&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req& 
dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5648528. Several more EU countries have intervened in the 
lawsuit than did in Kadi I, including the Czech Republic, Austria, Denmark, Luxembourg, 
Hungary, the Slovak Republic, Bulgaria, Italy, and Finland, all supporting the position of 
the Council, the Commission, or both. See Kadi I, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351, ¶¶ 113–115; Joined 
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added approximately 400 other individuals and entities to that list.3 
The Sanctions Committee directed Member States to freeze the assets 
and limit the travel of those individuals on the list,4 and until Novem-
ber 2002, no formal de-listing procedure existed.5 More than ten years 
after being added to the Consolidated List, Mr. Kadi awaits the out-
come of the appeal in his case.6 
 In 2008, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) annulled the Coun-
cil of the European Union (EC) regulation which gave direct effect to 
the United Nations (UN) sanctions regime as it applied to Mr. Kadi and 
the Al Barakaat International Foundation.7 In so doing, the ECJ as-
serted its right to review any European Community (Community)8 
measure for compliance with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the 
EC Treaty,9 regardless of whether that regulation directly transposes a 
                                                                                                                      
Cases C-584/10, C-593/10 and C-595/10, Order of the President of the Court (unpub-
lished, entered May 23, 2010), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf? 
text=&docid=111087&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1 
&cid=5651068. 
3 Cora True-Frost, The Development of Individual Standing in International Security, 32 
Cardozo L. Rev. 1183, 1209 (2011). As of October 3, 2012, 305 individuals and entities 
were listed. See generally Consolidated List, supra note 2 (listing 305 names). 
4 See S.C. Res. 1390, ¶¶ 1, 2(a)–(b), 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1390 ( Jan. 28, 2002). 
5 Hudson, supra note 2, at 207–08. 
6 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
7 See Kadi I, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351, Holding ¶ 2; see also Council Regulation 881/2002, 
Imposing Certain Specific Restrictive Measures Directed Against Certain Persons and Enti-
ties Associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida Network, and the Taliban, and Repeal-
ing Council Regulation (EC) 467/2001, 2002 O.J. (L 139) 9, 9–10, 13, 15; Finlay, supra 
note 1, at 480 & n.12. Al Barakaat is a Somali-based organization that was added to the 
Consolidated List in 2001. Kadi I, 2008 E.C.R. ¶ 33; Donald G. McNeil, Jr., How Blocking 
Assets Erased a Wisp of Prosperity, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 2002, at A10. Al Barakaat’s case was 
joined with Mr. Kadi’s. See Kadi I, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351, ¶ 120. 
8 Court of Justice of the Eur. Union, Court of Justice: Presentation: Foreword, Curia, http:// 
curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7024/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2012). The ECJ's website ex-
plains that what was previously Community law has since become European Union law under 
the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force on December 1, 2009. See id. The ECJ notes, 
however, that it uses the term “Community law” when referencing ECJ case-law before the 
treaty entered into force. Id. For consistency, this Comment will likewise use the term “Com-
munity law.” 
9 Klaus-Dieter Borchardt, The ABC of Community Law 8 (5th ed. 1999), available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/publications/booklets/eu_documentation/02/txt_en.pdf. The EC 
Treaty refers to the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), and 
the EU Treaty refers to the Treaty on European Union. Id. A consolidated version of the 
two treaties can be found in the Official Journal of the European Union. See Consolidated 
Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community, Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 O.J. (C 321) 1. This Comment uses the term “EU legal 
order” to refer to the total body of founding documents and laws of the European Union. 
4 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 35: E. Supp. 
Security Council resolution into the Community legal framework.10 
The court therefore indirectly ruled that the UN sanctions regime vio-
lated fundamental rights under the Treaty.11 Despite procedural im-
provements inspired in part by this decision, the General Court struck 
down the contested EC regulation in 2010.12 This is the decision the 
Council and Commission currently appeal.13 
 Part I of this Comment describes the background to the ECJ deci-
sion in Kadi v. Council (Kadi I ) and its aftermath, including the re-
cently-decided Kadi v. Commission (Kadi II ). Part II provides a discus-
sion of the dilemma of the 1267 sanctions regime, its evolution since 
2001, and the possible interpretive approaches the ECJ may have taken 
in its review of the contested regulation. Part III argues that the ECJ 
should employ different reasoning when it decides Kadi II on appeal 
than it used in Kadi I. Specifically, this Comment suggests that the ECJ 
should indicate that it would accept the decision of an independent 
court or tribunal as defined by the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) in the ECtHR’s interpretation of Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The ECJ could thereby remain 
consistent with Kadi I ’s emphasis on the autonomy of the European 
Union (EU) legal order while still allocating the primary responsibility 
for due process14 concerns to the Sanctions Committee itself, so that it 
may be more accountable to the individuals its regulations affect. 
I. Background 
 Nearly one year before 9/11, the Sanctions Committee altered its 
pre-existing sanctions regime to include a list—later entitled the “Con-
solidated List” —of individuals and entities associated with the Taliban, 
                                                                                                                      
10 See Kadi I, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351, ¶¶ 285–288. 
11 See id. ¶¶ 334–335, 342–343. While exhibiting caution not to contravene the Security 
Council resolution directly, the ECJ noted that Kadi’s rights to be heard and to have effec-
tive judicial review of his rights were “patently not respected.” See id. 
12 See Kadi II, 2010 E.C.R. _____, ¶¶ 170, 192–195. 
13 See Appeal Brought on 13th December 2010, supra note 2, at 9–10. 
14 Kadi I, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351, ¶ 334. In Kadi I, the ECJ held that Mr. Kadi's “right[s] to 
be heard” and “to effective judicial review” were infringed by the sanctions regime. Id. 
while recognizing due process as a term of art in some national jurisprudence, including 
the United States’, the term will be used throughout this Comment as shorthand for the 
“right[s] to be heard” and “to effective judicial review.” Id. This shorthand accords with 
other 1267 sanctions regime scholarship. See generally Jared Genser & Kate Barth, When Due 
Process Concerns Become Dangers: The Security Council's 1267 Regime and the Need for Reform, 33 
B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1 (2010) (articulating due process concerns tied to the 1267 
regime). 
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Al-Qaida, and Usama bin Laden.15 As the Sanctions Committee revised 
its procedures in subsequent resolutions, the EC passed common posi-
tions and regulations to mirror these changes.16 
 Mr. Kadi filed suit at the Court of First Instance (CFI)—which has 
since been renamed the General Court17—in late 2001, later amending 
his complaint to contest the newer Regulation 881/2002 as it applied to 
him.18 His complaint argued, inter alia, that the sanctions scheme 
breached his fundamental rights to be heard and to effective judicial 
review.19 
 The CFI rejected his claim after sharply circumscribing the scope 
of judicial review of EC regulations that give direct effect to Security 
Council resolutions.20 The CFI stated that Member States’ obligations 
to the UN have primacy over subsequent treaties, even the EC Treaty.21 
As such, the court disclaimed authority to question the lawfulness of 
the UN sanctions regime, except to review whether it comported with 
jus cogens.22 Under this narrow scope of review, the court found that in 
the context of counter-terrorism efforts, the applicant’s rights had not 
been deprived arbitrarily, and thus the penalty, as applied, did not vio-
late jus cogens.23 
                                                                                                                      
15 Finlay, supra note 1, at 479; see S.C. Res. 1333, pmbl., ¶ 8(c), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 
(Dec. 19, 2000). 
16 See Kadi I, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351, ¶¶ 40–45. 
17 See Craig Forcese & Kent Roach, Limping into the Future: The U.N. 1267 Terrorism List-
ing Process at the Crossroads, 42 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev 217, 247 (2010). 
18 See Kadi I, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351, ¶¶ 2, 39, 46; Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council (Kadi CFI 
Case), 2005 E.C.R. II-3649, ¶ 39. 
19 Kadi I, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351, ¶ 49. 
20 See Kadi CFI Case, 2005 E.C.R. II-3649, ¶¶ 217–225. 
21 See id. ¶¶ 193–194, 203–204. 
22 Id. ¶¶ 225–231. Jus cogens is a narrow body of “peremptory norms” of customary in-
ternational law. Vaughan Lowe, International Law 59 (2007). Jus cogens is defined in 
Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as “a norm accepted and rec-
ognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general 
international law having the same character.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
art. 53, May 23, 1969, 115 U.N.T.S. 331. These norms effectively set limits on what states 
can agree to do, by treaty or otherwise. See Lowe, supra, at 59. Which norms constitute jus 
cogens, however, is disputed. See id. Widely-accepted examples include the prohibition 
against genocide and slavery. Id. Other examples have less traction, including the prohibi-
tion on racial discrimination or the right to self-determination. Id. It follows that providing 
the full spectrum of due process protections in a counter-terrorism context is not likely 
required under jus cogens. See id. 
23 See Kadi CFI Case, 2005 E.C.R. II-3649, ¶¶ 238–243. 
6 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 35: E. Supp. 
 The ECJ did not take the CFI’s approach.24 The ECJ first noted 
that it did not per se have authority to review a Security Council resolu-
tion.25 The court held, however, that it did have the duty to review the 
implementing regulation for internal lawfulness; that is, to determine 
whether the implementing regulation respected the fundamental 
rights guaranteed by the EU legal order.26 The ECJ then found the asset 
freeze, as applied to Mr. Kadi, to be an unjustified deprivation of his 
fundamental rights.27 Many lauded this decision for championing hu-
man rights,28 but its significance also lies with the ECJ’s dualist29 reason-
ing, which emphasized the EU legal order’s autonomy and separateness 
from international law.30 
 While Kadi I was pending, the Security Council passed Resolution 
1822, which required states to provide details justifying each individ-
ual’s listing along with their proposed submissions to the Consolidated 
List.31 Immediately after Kadi I, the Sanctions Committee provided Mr. 
Kadi with the reasons justifying his listing.32 Soon after, Mr. Kadi sub-
mitted his response to the relatively vague allegations contained in this 
summary.33 Nevertheless, the Commission included Mr. Kadi on the list 
when it adopted its revised Regulation (EC) No. 1190/2008, informing 
him that it had “complied with” the ECJ judgment, which did not re-
quire any further evidence to be provided against him.34 
                                                                                                                      
24 Forcese & Roach, supra note 17, at 244. 
25 Kadi I, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351, ¶ 287. 
26 Id. ¶ 326. 
27 See id. ¶¶ 348–353, 369–371. 
28 Gráinne de Búrca, The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order After 
Kadi, 51 Harv. Int’l L.J. 1, 1–2 (2010). 
29 See id. at 2. Professor de Búrca explains that dualism emphasizes the separateness of 
international and domestic law. Id. at 2 n.4. Under this philosophy, international law is 
only incorporated into the domestic legal order insofar as it comports with domestic prin-
ciples, with little effort to shape the relationship between these two legal spheres. Id. An 
illustrative example of dualism is the treatment of international law in U.S. Supreme Court 
jurisprudence in cases such as Medellin v. Texas, in which the Court held that an Interna-
tional Court of Justice judgment is not valid in the United States absent congressional 
action. 552 U.S. 491, 513 (2008); de Búrca, supra note 28, at 2 & n.5. 
30 See de Búrca, supra note 28, at 2. 
31 See S.C. Res. 1822, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1822 ( June 30, 2008). 
32 Kadi II, 2010 E.C.R. _____, ¶¶ 49–50. 
33 Id. ¶¶ 55, 157. 
34 Id. pmbl., ¶¶ 60–61; Commission Regulation 1190/2008, Amending for the 101st 
Time Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 Imposing Certain Restrictive Measures Di-
rected Against Certain Persons and Entities Associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-
Qaida Network, and the Taliban, 2008 O.J. (L 322) 25, 25–26 [hereinafter Commission 
Regulation 1190/2008]. 
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II. Discussion 
A. The Dilemma of United Nations Accountability in the Sanctions Regime 
 Commentators have noted the recent shift in the role of the UN 
Security Council.35 The Security Council has traditionally occupied the 
role of an “enforcer of collective security,” issuing non-binding resolu-
tions that apply to specific conflicts or situations.36 In contrast, targeted 
sanctions are binding and apply generally, not just to states, but to indi-
viduals.37 In this sense, the Security Council acts like a “world legislator” 
or “global law maker.”38 
 Despite the fact that the sanctions regime affects individuals di-
rectly,39 the Security Council has not created an independent, impartial 
tribunal to review challenges to Sanctions Committee decisions, includ-
ing those regarding placement on the Consolidated List.40 Until 2002, 
there was no way for a listed person to be formally removed from the 
Consolidated List.41 Following significant legal and humanitarian criti-
cism, the Sanctions Committee permitted humanitarian exceptions 
and established a procedural “focal point” through which de-listing and 
derogation requests could be directly submitted.42 
 Subsequent Security Council resolutions ensured that the indi-
viduals listed, and their countries of nationality and host countries, 
would be notified of their listing.43 Security Council Resolution 1822 
also requires nations to provide a list of reasons justifying why an indi-
vidual or group should be added, and for summaries of these reasons 
to be made available on the Sanctions Committee’s website.44 As 
                                                                                                                      
35 See Finlay, supra note 1, at 489–90; Hudson, supra note 2, at 203. 
36 Finlay, supra note 1, at 489–90. 
37 Hudson, supra note 2, at 205; see Finlay, supra note 1, at 490. 
38 Finlay, supra note 1, at 489–90. 
39 Id. at 490. For a personal account from one of the individuals on the Consolidated 
List, see Neal Rockwell, Abousfian Abdelrazik’s Statement to the UN 1267 Committee, Coop Mé-
dia de Montréal ( June 17, 2011), http://montreal.mediacoop.ca/video/abousfian-abdel 
raziks-statement-un-1267-committee/7513. 
40 See Case T-85/09, Kadi v. Comm’n (Kadi II ), 2010 E.C.R. _____ (not yet published, 
decided Sept. 30, 2010), ¶ 128, available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text&docid=83733&pageIndex=0
&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1039687; True-Frost, supra note 
3, at 1239. 
41 Hudson, supra note 2, at 207–08. 
42 Forcese & Roach, supra note 17, at 223, 225; see Finlay, supra note 1, at 481–82. 
43 S.C. Res. 1822, supra note 31, ¶¶ 12, 15. 
44 Id. ¶¶ 13, 23. For examples of these summaries, see Narrative Summaries of Reasons for 
Listing, Al-Qaida Sanctions Comm., http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/individuals_ 
associated_with_Al-Qaida.shtml (last visited Nov. 5, 2012). 
8 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 35: E. Supp. 
pointed out by the General Court in Kadi II, however, these summaries 
are often “general, unsubstantiated, vague and unparticularised,” and 
do not require the production of any evidence to buttress the allega-
tions contained therein.45 
 Further emphasizing the separation between the individual and the 
Sanctions Committee, Mr. Kadi received his summary of reasons 
through France’s permanent representative to the UN.46 Mr. Kadi ulti-
mately contested these allegations, not in front of the Sanctions Com-
mittee itself, but in front of the Commission, which decided, neverthe-
less to include him in Regulation 1190/2008’s revised list.47 The General 
Court, as well as some commentators, noted how difficult reviewing the 
evidence against Mr. Kadi would be for the Commission: it is not likely 
to gain access to sensitive national security information guarded closely 
by the state that has nominated an individual for listing.48 
 The Sanctions Committee has since taken steps to ameliorate vari-
ous procedural concerns, including the establishment of an Office of 
the Ombudsperson, which impartially and independently reviews re-
quests for removal from the Consolidated List.49 In 2010, however, the 
General Court found that the Office of the Ombudsperson did not 
constitute a sufficiently robust improvement in procedure because 
Committee consensus was still required to de-list an individual.50 De-
spite this finding, the most recent resolution continues the term of the 
Ombudsperson.51 In an effort to increase transparency, the resolution 
also urges, but does not require, Member States to identify themselves 
when submitting a proposed individual’s name to the Consolidated 
List.52 To date, it appears that the Commission has not substantially re-
                                                                                                                      
45 Kadi II, 2010 E.C.R. _____, ¶ 157. 
46 See id. ¶¶ 49–50. 
47 Id. ¶¶ 55–58; see Commission Regulation 1190/2008, supra note 34, at 25. 
48 See Kadi II, 2010 E.C.R. _____, ¶ 98; Finlay, supra note 1, at 495; Forcese & Roach, 
supra note 17, at 219; Richard Barrett, Al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Threatened, Wash. 
Inst. (Oct. 6, 2008), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2935. 
49 S.C. Res. 1904, ¶¶ 20–21, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1904 (Dec. 17, 2009). 
50 See Kadi II, 2010 E.C.R. _____, ¶ 128; Joined Cases C-402 & 415/05, Kadi v. Council 
(Kadi I ), 2008 E.C.R. I-6351, ¶ 323. 
51 S.C. Res. 1989, ¶¶ 20–21, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1989 ( June 17, 2011). A listing of resolu-
tions related to the operation of the 1267 Committee is available online; the most recent of 
these resolutions is 1989. See Security Council Resolutions Related to the Work of the Committee Estab-
lished Pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999) Concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Indi-
viduals and Entities, Al-Qaida Sanctions Comm., http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/ 
resolutions.shtml (last visited Nov. 5, 2012). 
52 See S.C. Res. 1989, supra note 51, ¶ 14. 
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vised its procedures; rather, it has continued to update the Consoli-
dated List in step with the Sanctions Committee.53 
B. Judicial Responses to Security Council Resolution Implementation  
in the Sanctions Context 
 The ECJ noted in Kadi I that the UN Charter stipulates no specific 
model for implementing Security Council resolutions,54 and indeed not 
all Member States use the same method as the EU.55 For example, the 
United States implements Security Council resolutions through its ex-
ecutive branch, therefore U.S. courts have not yet addressed the rela-
tionship between the domestic legal order and Security Council resolu-
tions.56 
 The ECtHR has, in contrast, adopted a deferential stance regard-
ing Security Council determinations.57 The ECtHR completely rejected 
the possibility of exercising jurisdiction over acts “ultimately attribut-
able” to the Security Council.58 In Behrami v. France, the ECtHR justified 
its deference by noting the similarity in values underlying both the 
ECHR and the UN Charter.59 The court also stated that asserting juris-
diction would impermissibly disrupt the Security Council’s mission in 
that case.60 
 The CFI took a similar tack in Kadi I, holding that the UN Charter 
has primacy over all other international obligations, including agree-
ments concluded between EU countries, and thus rejected a dualist 
                                                                                                                      
53 See, e.g., Commission Implementing Regulation 876/2011, Amending for the 157th 
Time Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 Imposing Certain Specific Restrictive Meas-
ures Directed Against Certain Persons and Entities Associated with the Al-Qaida Network, 
2011 O.J. (L 227) 11, 11 (implementing the Sanctions Committee’s decision to remove an 
individual from the list by removing that individual from Annex I of Regulation (EC) No 
881/2002). 
54 Kadi I, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351, ¶ 298. 
55 See Forcese & Roach, supra note 17, at 258. In the United States, terrorist designa-
tions are made through the Office of Foreign Assets Control, a branch of the Department 
of the Treasury, pursuant to Executive Order. See Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzalez, 
477 F.3d 728, 731, 734 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 
333 F.3d 156, 159, 160 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
56 See Forcese & Roach, supra note 17, at 258. 
57 de Búrca, supra note 28, at 11, 15. 
58 Id. at 14, 16. Interestingly, the ECJ asserted in Kadi I, without much explanation, 
that the contested regulation “cannot be considered to be an act directly attributable” to 
the UN. See Kadi I, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351, ¶ 314. The ECJ stated that the circumstances under 
which Kadi I’s jurisdictional questions arose were in “fundamentally different circum-
stances.” Id. 
59 de Búrca, supra note 28, at 15. 
60 Id. 
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vision of the relationship between the Community and international 
legal orders.61 The CFI reasoned that only applying jus cogens norms, a 
narrow and contested body of international law, could check the Secu-
rity Council.62 
 In contrast, Advocate General Poiares Maduro, the ECJ, and most 
recently the General Court, refused to grant Security Council resolu-
tions immunity from review.63 These three opinions stated that the EC 
regulations implementing Security Council resolutions should comport 
not with international rights protections, but with guarantees of funda-
mental rights protected by the EC Treaty.64 Article 6(1) of the EU Treaty 
sets forth these “fundamental rights,” including the “principles of lib-
erty, democracy, and respect for human rights.”65 In both Kadi I and 
Kadi II, the courts noted that Mr. Kadi’s right to judicial protection was 
denied because the UN employed inadequate procedures to review list-
ing decisions.66 The ECJ did not clarify, however, whether it would be 
willing to accept the decision of an independent court or tribunal that 
provided sufficient judicial protection in the course of reviewing the 
merits of Mr. Kadi’s or others’ claims.67 After noting the absence of 
adequate procedural protections at the Sanctions Committee level, the 
General Court in Kadi II stated that it then fell to Community institu-
tions, not necessarily to the Sanctions Committee, to ensure implemen-
tation of adequate safeguards.68 
III. Analysis 
 Many commentators agree that the sanctions regime, despite vari-
ous reforms, continues to violate due process.69 The Sanctions Commit-
                                                                                                                      
61 See Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council (Kadi CFI Case), 2005 E.C.R. II-3649, ¶ 208; de 
Búrca, supra note 28, at 19–20. 
62 See de Búrca, supra note 28, at 19, 20–21. 
63 Kadi I, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351, ¶ 321–322; Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro 
in Case C-402/05, Kadi v. Council (Kadi I ), 2008 E.C.R. I-6363, ¶ 28, 40 [hereinafter Opin-
ion of AG Maduro]; see Kadi II, 2010 E.C.R. _____, ¶¶ 112, 126. The Advocate General 
(AG) of the ECJ provides an advisory opinion in advance of the ECJ’s final decision. See de 
Búrca, supra note 28, at 22–23. The AG’s opinion is considered persuasive, but not bind-
ing, on a subsequent ECJ decision. Id. at 23. 
64 de Búrca, supra note 28, at 41; see Kadi II, 2010 E.C.R. _____, ¶¶ 125–126; Kadi I, 
2008 E.C.R. I-6351, ¶¶ 285, 316–317, 322; Opinion of AG Maduro, supra note 63, ¶ 40. 
65 Kadi II, 2010 E.C.R. _____, ¶ 119. 
66 See id. ¶¶ 157, 171, 180; Kadi I, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351, ¶¶ 324, 352. 
67 See Kadi I, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351, ¶¶ 322–330; de Búrca, supra note 28, at 25. 
68 See Kadi II, 2010 E.C.R. _____, ¶ 187. 
69 See Finlay, supra note 1, at 481; Forcese & Roach, supra note 17, at 219; Hudson, su-
pra note 2, at 213. 
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tee has reaffirmed that the nature of the sanctions are preventative and 
not punitive, yet review of the sanctions as applied to specific individuals 
renders this assertion difficult to support.70 The Sanctions Committee 
listed most individuals in 2001, the vast majority of whom still remain on 
the Consolidated List.71 The indefinite duration and severity of these 
sanctions result in the functional equivalent of a criminal punishment, 
yet virtually none of the guarantees of due process are observed.72 
 Even with the added oversight offered by the Ombudsperson, an 
applicant seeking de-listing faces significant obstacles, including con-
testing vague allegations backed by sensitive national security evidence 
that most states refuse to reveal.73 A shroud also surrounds the efficacy 
of the system itself—it is unclear whether the sanctions scheme pro-
vides benefits significant enough to warrant the rights deprivations it 
imposes.74 As such, the vesting of concentrated power with the Sanc-
tions Committee, and with the national executives who bypass their leg-
islatures to implement Security Council measures, becomes even more 
troubling.75 This concentration of power emphasizes the importance of 
judicial intervention in the sanctions context.76 
 Navigating the legal framework of Security Council resolutions and 
domestic constitutional law poses significant challenges to national and 
regional courts.77 In this situation, however, courts serve as a crucial 
safeguard of domestic constitutions and the rights they confer.78 The 
                                                                                                                      
70 S.C. Res. 1989, supra note 51, pmbl.; see Case T-85/09, Kadi v. Comm’n (Kadi II ), 
2010 E.C.R. _____ (not yet published, decided Sept. 30, 2010), ¶ 150, available at http:// 
curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text&docid=83733&pageIndex=0&doclang 
=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1039687; Forcese & Roach, supra note 17, 
at 237; Hudson, supra note 2, at 218. 
71 Hudson, supra note 2, at 206–07; see True-Frost, supra note 3, at 1198 n.46, 1209, 
1218. 
72 Hudson, supra note 2, at 218; See Joined Cases C-402 & 415/05, Kadi v. Council (Kadi I ), 
2008 E.C.R. I-6351, ¶¶ 322–324, 352; Forcese & Roach, supra note 17, at 237. 
73 See Kadi II, 2010 E.C.R. _____, ¶¶ 128, 157; Forcese & Roach, supra note 17, at 266–68. 
74 See Forcese & Roach, supra note 17, at 262; Hudson, supra note 2, at 224–25. 
75 See Forcese & Roach, supra note 17, at 237; Kim Lane Scheppele, Global Security 
Law and the Challenge to Constitutionalism After 9/11, Public Law Lecture, Glasgow, 
Scotland, (Feb. 18, 2010). Scheppele notes that the domestic legislatures of Member States 
often do not have the opportunity to decide whether to implement a law under Security 
Council resolutions; rather, they are only able to decide how to implement that law once 
instructed to do so. See id. In the United Kingdom and the United States, Security Council 
Resolutions are implemented by Orders in Council and Executive Orders, respectively, in 
which the executive need not consult the legislature before implementing the asset-
freezing regime. Id. 
76 See Scheppele, supra note 75. 
77 See id. at 19–20. 
78 See id. at 22–23. 
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ECJ’s message regarding the sanctions regime’s impermissibility mir-
rored the sentiments of many Member States, and very likely influenced 
the Sanctions Committee’s choice to grant some form of standing to 
listed individuals.79 In addition, it seems that the Sanctions Committee 
actually expected a response from national courts.80 The judiciary 
clearly has a crucial role in navigating and shaping this complex area of 
law. Therefore the messages sent by the court through its reasoning in 
decisions like Kadi I and Kadi II become ever more critical.81 
 One commentator, Graínne de Búrca, suggests that the ECJ’s rea-
soning should have emphasized “respect for basic principles of due 
process and human rights protection under international law,” rather 
than using dualist language to separate the EU legal order from inter-
national law.82 Rather than dualism being interpreted as “inherently 
bad or good,” however, “[t]he ultimate question is the ends to which 
dualism . . . is employed.”83 An approach emphasizing international 
legal principles would have reaffirmed the EU’s status as a “normative 
power,” but Kadi I ’s dualist reasoning helped expose the injustice in 
the 1267 sanctions regime.84 
 Professor de Búrca also presents the reasonable alternative that 
the ECJ should have proceeded as the German Constitutional Court 
did in its Solange I & II decisions.85 If the ECJ had engaged in this dia-
logue, de Búrca argues, the ECJ would have been better able to shape 
the relationship between the EU and UN by harmonizing these two 
legal orders.86 Solange I involved a conflict between domestic and 
Community law, which mirrors the international-or-supranational con-
flict in Kadi I.87 The German Constitutional Court in Solange I reviewed 
                                                                                                                      
79 See S.C. Res. 1989, supra note 51, pmbl. (“Recognizing the [legal] challenges . . . 
welcoming improvements to the Committee’s procedures and the quality of the Consoli-
dated List, and expressing its intent to continue efforts to ensure that procedures are fair 
and clear.”); Forcese & Roach, supra note 17, at 253, 271; True-Frost, supra note 3, at 1210 
n.90, 1241. 
80 See Opinion of AG Maduro, supra note 63, ¶ 38. 
81 See de Búrca, supra note 28, at 41–42; True-Frost, supra note 3, at 1241. 
82 de Búrca, supra note 28, at 2 & n.4, 4, 41–42 (emphasis added). 
83 Forcese & Roach, supra note 17, at 270, 271. 
84 Id. at 271; see de Búrca, supra note 28, at 6 n.19, 47 n.240, 48–49. 
85 de Búrca, supra note 28, at 42–43. Although the EU is a party in both cases, in Kadi, 
the ECJ occupies the same role as the German Constitutional Court did in Solange I & II, 
as it acts as the “constitutional court of the municipal legal order” relative to the UN. 
Opinion of AG Maduro, supra note 63, ¶ 37; see de Búrca, supra note 28, at 43–44. 
86 See de Búrca, supra note 28, at 42–44. 
87 See id. at 42–43. Professor de Búrca notes that the dispute in Solange “was not only 
between a provision of the German Basic Law and an EC Regulation but also between the 
 
2012] The European Courts and UN Security Council Resolutions 13 
an EC regulation for compatibility with German law, emphasizing not 
the autonomy of the German domestic legal structure—as the ECJ did 
with Community law in Kadi I—but rather, the “mutually disciplining 
relationship between the two legal systems.”88 In 1986, twelve years after 
Solange I, the court decided Solange II, and held that that because of 
progress in rights protections, the EC regulation was immune from re-
view for compliance with domestic fundamental rights.89 This decision 
effectively disclaimed domestic jurisdiction over similar cases as long as 
the ECJ adequately safeguarded those rights.90 
 The ECJ’s reasoning does not clarify what level of judicial protec-
tion would justify finding an EC regulation that implements Security 
Council resolutions immune from review, like the German Constitu-
tional Court did in Solange II.91 Given the ECJ’s unwillingness to engage 
in the soft-constitutionalist, dialogic approach of the German Constitu-
tional Court, or to base its decision on fundamental rights guaranteed 
by international law as de Búrca suggests they might have chosen to do, 
it is unclear whether it would adopt either approach in the future.92 
 The sanctions regime’s encroachment on domestic protections 
guaranteed by Community law is severe.93 The nature of this en-
croachment may have deterred the ECJ from using gentler, more har-
monious language, and perhaps even warranted the creation of dis-
tance between the Security Council and the EU legal order.94 The ECJ’s 
impending decision in the Kadi II appeal may reflect a middle ground: 
the court may reinforce the EU’s legal autonomy to remain consistent 
with Kadi I while simultaneously applying pressure to the UN, instead 
of the EC, to implement appropriate due process protections.95 
                                                                                                                      
internal constitutional norms of one political entity and the legal requirements imposed 
by an international or supranational system of which the former entity is a part.” Id. 
88 See id. 43–44. 
89 See id. 
90 See id. at 42 n.214, 43–44. 
91 See de Búrca, supra note 28, at 44; see also Kadi I, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351, ¶¶ 322–330. 
92 See Kadi I, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351, ¶ 329; de Búrca, supra note 28, at 41–44. 
93 See Kadi II, supra note 70, ¶¶ 119, 171, 192–196. 
94 See de Búrca, supra note 28, at 41–44; Forcese & Roach, supra note 17, at 271; 
Scheppele, supra note 75. 
95 See Kadi II, 2010 E.C.R. _____, ¶ 187; Iain Cameron, UN Targeted Sanctions, Legal 
Safeguards and the European Convention on Human Rights, 72 Nordic J. Int’l L. 159, 159, 166 
(2003); de Búrca, supra note 28, at 44; Forcese & Roach, supra note 17, at 265, 271; 
Hudson, supra note 2, at 226; True-Frost, supra note 3, at 1241. 
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 The ECJ and General Court judgments in Kadi I and Kadi II 
reached correct outcomes.96 Nevertheless, both courts should have en-
couraged the UN to establish an independent tribunal to ensure ade-
quate due process protections, rather than leaving that responsibility 
with the EU.97 The ECJ should not have drawn primarily from interna-
tional law in its reasoning, as de Búrca suggests.98 Instead, the court 
should have drawn, as the General Court did in Kadi II, on the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR.99 
 On the current appeal of Kadi II, the ECJ has the opportunity to 
decide to accept the decision of an “independent court or tribunal,” 
and whether that satisfies the ECtHR’s definition under Article 6 of the 
ECHR, ultimately delineating what constitutes a fair trial.100 The ECtHR 
has discussed fair trials in the national security context.101 In Öcalan v. 
Turkey, for example, the ECtHR held that military tribunals trying 
individuals identified as national security threats must still be 
“independent of the executive and legislature at [all] stages of the 
proceedings.”102 Adopting the jurisprudence of the ECtHR would 
provide a clear standard by which to judge whether an applicant’s 
rights have been infringed, and would thereby send a clear message to 
the UN about satisfactory procedural protections.103 This  approach 
would also be consistent with Kadi I, because by relying on the ECtHR 
instead of the UN for its standards, the ECJ preserves the EU legal 
order’s independence from the Security Council.104 
                                                                                                                      
96 See Forcese & Roach, supra note 17, at 271; Scheppele, supra note 75; True-Frost, su-
pra note 3, at 1241. 
97 See Kadi II, 2010 E.C.R. ______, ¶ 187; de Búrca, supra note 28, at 41–42; Forcese & 
Roach, supra note 17, at 265, 270, 271; Hudson, supra note 2, at 226. 
98 See de Búrca, supra note 28, at 41–42; Forcese & Roach, supra note 17, at 271. 
99 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
art. 6, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Convention]; Kadi II, 2010 E.C.R. _____, 
¶¶ 176–177; Öcalan v. Turkey, App. No. 46221/99, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 985, 1023 (2005); 
Opinion of AG Maduro, supra note 63, at I-6385; de Búrca, supra note 28, at 24–25, 44. 
Pursuant to the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU must accede to the European Convention on 
Human Rights. Press Release, Europa, European Commission and Council of Europe Kick 
Off Joint Talks on EU’s Accession to the Convention on Human Rights ( July 7, 2010), 
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/906. 
100 See Convention, supra note 99, art. 6; Kadi II, 2010 E.C.R. _____, ¶ 177; Opinion of 
AG Maduro, supra note 63, ¶ 54. 
101 See, e.g., Öcalan, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1023; infra note 102 and accompanying text. 
102 See, e.g., Öcalan, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1023. 
103 See Convention, supra note 99, art. 6; Öcalan, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1023; de Búrca, 
supra note 28, at 24, 25 (noting “the extensive and growing body of legal principles” that 
constitute fundamental rights, and that these principles are currently “determined almost 
entirely by the ECJ”). 
104 See Kadi II, 2010 E.C.R. _____, ¶¶ 176–177; de Búrca, supra note 28, at 44. 
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Conclusion 
 The bottom-line outcomes of both Kadi I and Kadi II appropriately 
invalidated the EU’s implementation of the UN 1267 regime. The first 
incarnation of the sanctions regime provided no way to de-list 
individuals or formally allow them to challenge a listing decision. While 
the system has evolved considerably in response to judicial and political 
pressure, states can still nominate individuals anonymously and need 
not produce evidence to buttress their allegations. The sanctions 
regime continues to deny listing individuals fundamental due process 
protections, including the right to be heard and the right to effective 
judicial review. 
 The ECJ ultimately refused to grant the EC regulation at issue— 
which gave Security Council listing resolutions direct effect—immunity 
from review, and employed dualist language to emphasize the EU legal 
order’s autonomy from international law. This approach was justified 
given the severity of the sanctions regime’s encroachment on domestic 
rights guarantees. The ECJ should allocate to the UN, not to EU insti-
tutions, responsibility for ensuring protection of constitutional guaran-
tees. It can do this by indicating it would accept the decision of a court 
that satisfies the ECtHR’s definition of an independent and impartial 
tribunal under Article 6 of the ECHR. In this way, the ECJ can remain 
consistent with Kadi I by looking to the EU, rather than the UN, for its 
standards, but still encourage the UN to create a tribunal to remedy 
these rights violations. 
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